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THE ELUSIVE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS 
EQUALITY 
ROBIN CHARLOW* 
Raging national debates about the relationship of church and state 
often find parties sparring over whether the government is treating 
religious interests equally. This essay endeavors to explain why there is 
such widespread disagreement about the meaning of religious equality. It 
explores both jurisprudential and doctrinal sources of dispute, including: 
the multidimensional nature of equality generally, the uniqueness of 
religion, the difficulty of defining religion, and the problem of identifying 
the proper baseline or point of comparison for assessing religious 
equality. Ultimately, we cannot separate issues of religious equality from 
disputes about the meaning of the Constitution's religion clauses. The 
essay presents the thesis that, on a collective level, we may suffer from a 
long-standing, national uncertainty or ambiguity about religion and the 
ideal relationship between church and state, accounting in part for our 
endless conflict over the meaning of the religion clauses. The essay 
concludes by examining whether it is possible to resolve or avoid 
questions of religious equality and, if not, what useful lesson can be drawn 
from our uncertain history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The notion of equality pervades the law regarding religion. Almost 
every issue arising in this area is at some point discussed in terms of 
equality or inequality. For example, in the debate over school vouchers, 
some maintain that opportunities to use public funds at parochial schools 
restore equity to religious families, while others argue that they place 
religious schools or families in a preferred position.1 Objections to the 
exemption of religious employers from otherwise applicable civil rights 
law obligations are often based on the perception that exemptions treat 
religious entities in a preferred, unequal way.2 Discussions about public 
religious displays often address whether certain elements are barred, 
 1. Compare Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 842–44 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(arguing that direct aid to religious schools would constitute government endorsement of religion and 
place such institutions in a preferred position, while school vouchers that go to parents instead simply 
place them in the relatively equal position of choosing or declining religious education for their 
children), with George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 
936–40 (1988) (arguing that reimbursement to parents of parochial school students in an amount 
matching that which is spent in public schools per student would restore equality to the religious); see 
also Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 341 (1999) (maintaining that the issue of whether to include or exclude religious schools from 
generally available government benefit programs is one of equality versus discrimination). Cf. Ira C. 
Lupu & Robert Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and 
Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 539, 543–48 (2002) (summarizing the positions of four 
dominant strains of religion clause theory, only some of which focus on equality, on school voucher 
programs). 
 2. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The 
Fragmentation and Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 
89, 170–71 (1990) (discussing Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 
(1987), and the case’s analysis of Title VII); Christopher Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The 
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1245, 1248 (1994) (noting that universal rejection of the state imposing sex- and race-based anti-
discrimination rules on the choice of clergy “may seem to support the idea that religion is 
constitutionally privileged,” but ultimately questioning this view); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise 
Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 
417 (1987) (setting forth some inequalities in exempting religious institutions from otherwise 
applicable employment discrimination laws); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional 
Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 
1049, 1076–78 (1996) (arguing that “principles of equality and religious freedom seem to conflict . . . 
in employment discrimination cases filed against religious institutions,” because “the state explicitly 
grants [such institutions] the right to [discriminate] with specific exemptions from civil rights laws”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/3
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permitted, or even required in order to maintain equality either among 
religions or between religious and non-religious speakers and symbols.3 
Questions about equality abound in a wide variety of religious 
disputes.4 Should religious groups be provided equal access to public 
schools and other facilities,5 and if so, do any or all restrictions on access 
render such access unequal?6 Do equality principles mandate that speakers 
be permitted to include prayers at government-sponsored events?7 If 
government-sponsored prayer is ever permitted,8 is it possible to fashion a 
prayer or program of prayers that treats religions equally?9 
Religious equality is a common point of departure in academic and 
judicial circles as well. Legal academics from opposite sides of the church-
 3. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (adopting the analysis 
from Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly that would hinge a finding of 
endorsement on the physical setting in which a religious symbol is placed within a holiday display); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680–81 (1984) (discussing whether the inclusion of a creche in a 
holiday display is constitutionally impermissible because it confers “a substantial . . . benefit on 
religion in general and on the Christian faith in particular”); id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the creche at issue in the case did not favor Christian beliefs because it was neutralized 
by other elements of the setting in which it appeared); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a 
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 126–27 (1992) (explaining that, under the Court’s decisions, 
public displays may include a religious symbol only if it is in close proximity to a number of secular 
objects to mitigate the religious message—holdings collectively referred to as “the three-plastic 
animals rule”). 
 4. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 727 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that 
a college student otherwise eligible for a state scholarship that he was not permitted to use toward his 
major in theology “is not asking for a special benefit . . . . He seeks only equal treatment . . . .”) 
(citation omitted). 
 5. See, e.g., Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2004) (prohibiting public secondary schools 
that receive federal financial assistance from restricting access to “limited open for[a]” on the basis of 
religion); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–10 (2001) (holding that an 
elementary school used as a limited public forum may not discriminate against an extracurricular club 
that discusses morals and character from a religious viewpoint without engaging in unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination). 
 6. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 783 (2002) 
(raising questions about equality of treatment if, under the Equal Access Act, different rules for faculty 
sponsors apply to religious clubs as opposed to other clubs). 
 7. Compare Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (invalidating a Texas 
school board policy allowing students to elect a student chaplain to deliver a prayer over the school’s 
public announcement system before home football games), with Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 250 
F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001) (upholding a county school board’s facially neutral policy that would allow 
a student-elected speaker to pray at a public school’s graduation ceremony); see also Doe v. Madison 
Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding a school district’s high school graduation speech 
policy in which student speakers chosen on the basis of academic merit are permitted to deliver an 
address of their choosing that may include prayer); MCCONNELL, supra note 6, at 808–09 (discussing 
related problems of possibly private speech in government settings). 
 8. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of paid state 
legislative chaplains leading daily prayers). 
 9. See id. at 819–21 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the difficulty of composing a non-
denominational prayer).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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state debate may not agree on very much, but they seem largely to agree 
that equality is a, if not the, central concern of both of the Federal 
Constitution’s religion clauses.10 The concept takes on particularly great 
importance today, as the United States Supreme Court has placed religious 
equality front and center in its interpretation of both the Establishment and 
Free Exercise Clauses. After years of searching about for the proper 
principles to apply in implementing these provisions, the Court seems to 
have settled on a jurisprudence of equality for both.11 With regard to Free 
Exercise, the prevailing doctrine since Employment Division v. Smith12 
imposes what could be described as an equality-based regime regarding 
constitutionally required religious accommodations.13 The latest 
 10. See, e.g., Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 2, at 1248 (advocating abandonment of the 
“paradigm of privilege,” pursuant to which religion is treated unequally because it is considered 
uniquely valuable, and substituting instead a notion of equal protection against discrimination for 
especially vulnerable—that is, minority—religious practices); John H. Garvey, Freedom and Equality 
in the Religion Clauses, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 194 (1981) (characterizing the Supreme Court case 
of Thomas v. Review Board as presenting a question of religious equality rather than, as the Court 
assumed, religious freedom); Timothy L. Hall, Religion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 
3 (1992) (“Although the final version of the First Amendment does not explicitly refer to equality, the 
strong historical association of equality with religious liberty has been an important fixture in the 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Religion Clauses.”); William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith 
and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 317 (1991) (pointing out the distinction 
between his and McConnell’s views on the role that equality plays in understanding free exercise 
exemptions, impliedly acknowledging that both see equality, however they understand it, as the issue); 
McConnell, supra note 3, at 117 (maintaining that one of the purposes of the religion clauses is to 
preserve the rights of religious believers and communities “to participate fully and equally with their 
fellow citizens in public life without being forced to shed their religious convictions and character”). 
But cf. Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 
9, 11–13 (2004) (suggesting that equality is only one in a broad set of intertwined values that inform 
both of the religion clauses). See also Bernadette Meyler, 47 B.C. L. REV. 275 (2006) (positing that 
free exercise rights were central to the early understanding of the equal protection principle, and 
arguing for a revival of the connection between the two concepts to clarify and correct both 
jurisprudential strands). 
 11. Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original Theology to 
Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 2, 5–10 (2000); see also Noah Feldman, 
From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673 
(2002) (maintaining that the Supreme Court has transformed the rationale of the Establishment Clause 
over the last fifty years from protecting the liberty of religious dissenters to guaranteeing the equality 
of religious minorities); Hall, supra note 10, at 3–5; William P. Marshall, What Is the Matter With 
Equality?: An Assessment of the Equal Treatment of Religion and Nonreligion in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 193, 196–200 (2000) (noting that the Court requires equal treatment of all 
religions and of religion and nonreligion). 
 12. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 13. Conkle, supra note 11, at 7 (explaining that the Smith Court believed that granting Free 
Exercise exemptions would “create[] an undue risk of discrimination between or among religions, a 
risk that cannot be reconciled with the paramount requirement of denominational equality”); id. at 11–
14 (explaining how formal neutrality “currently dominates the law of free exercise,” both 
constitutionally, where it is actually the rule, and legislatively, where it is effectively the rule owing to 
Court-imposed limitations); see also Hall, supra note 10, at 5 (“[I]n free exercise cases, the concept of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/3
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Establishment Clause rulings as well employ a rule of “neutrality” that, 
although perhaps not exactly equivalent to equality,14 significantly echoes 
equality concerns.15 Even older Establishment Clause doctrines—
including the infamous Lemon test16 and Justice O’Connor’s no-
endorsement rule17—compare the treatment of different religions, or of 
religious versus non-religious interests, in a manner that implicates 
equality ideals.18 
Yet, despite the centrality of equality in the jurisprudence of religion, 
we do not have a common understanding of what it means to treat religion 
equally. This essay will not explore what constitutes religious equality, 
however, either as a general matter or in any of the particular contexts 
mentioned. Many have already traveled that road.19 Rather, it will examine 
why we have so much trouble arriving at a consensus about what religious 
equality means. After all, even if we disagree about whether and when 
equality also occupies a significant place in the Court’s contemporary rhetoric.”). 
 14. See discussion infra notes 46–47. 
 15. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 670 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(describing as neutral a program in which government aid is available to both religious and secular 
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis); id. at 696 (Souter, J., dissenting) (referring to the sense of 
neutrality as evenhandedness between potential religious and secular recipients of government 
money); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (describing, as an example of the principle of 
neutrality, a program in which government aid is available on equal terms to “the religious, irreligious, 
and areligious”). But cf. id. at 878 (Souter, J., dissenting) (indicating that neutrality has been used to 
describe at least three things: equipoise between government encouragement and discouragement of 
religion, a secular benefit, and evenhandedness in distribution of a benefit). See also Hall, supra note 
10, at 4 (discussing 1980s–1990s Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases: “[T]he Court has veered 
away from ‘separation’ as an interpretive aid and has looked increasingly to Justice O’Connor’s no-
endorsement test, which is rooted in the idea of equal respect for citizens.”); Frank S. Ravitch, A 
Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment 
Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 493 (2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court appears to be on a course towards 
making neutrality the centerpiece of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”). 
 16. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 17. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690–92 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (proposing 
a test that examines whether a challenged government practice has the purpose or effect of endorsing 
religion). 
 18. See Conkle, supra note 11, at 9–10, 16 (maintaining that the second prong of the Lemon test, 
which looks at the effect of the government’s action, evinces the Supreme Court’s concern for 
substantive neutrality, described by Douglas Laycock as requiring the government to “minimize the 
extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpratice, 
observance or nonobservance”); Hall, supra note 10, at 4 (describing O’Connor’s no-endorsement rule 
as an equality-based notion that “is rooted in the idea of equal respect for citizens” based on their 
religious affiliations). 
 19. See, for example, Hall, supra note 10; Marshall, supra note 11; Michael W. McConnell, The 
Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000); Ravitch, supra note 15; and Jay A. 
Sekulow, et al., Religious Freedom and the First Self-Evident Truth: Equality as a Guiding Principle 
in Interpreting the Religion Clauses, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 351 (1995), for views of the matter 
from differing perspectives. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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religious equality is required, perhaps we ought to be able to agree on 
what it is.20 
The reasons for this difficulty may be divided into two groups: those 
that center around analytical jurisprudence, discussed in Part I, and those 
that stem from constitutional doctrine, discussed in Part II. Among the 
jurisprudential issues, Part I.A observes that equality in general and 
religious equality in particular are multidimensional concepts, each facet 
of which invites dispute. Part I.B argues that religion is difficult to classify 
definitively as either a status, a belief system, or a set of acts, so that it is 
not comparable to items that fall more neatly into one or another of these 
categories. Part I.C discusses the problem of defining religion.  
Considering doctrinally-based difficulties, Part II.A deals with the issue 
of identifying the baseline for assessing religious neutrality, a construct 
that is often viewed as largely overlapping equality. Part II.B more directly 
discusses the baseline or comparative point of departure for equality in 
general and religious equality in particular. I maintain that setting a 
baseline for determining religious equality is especially problematic 
because the appropriate baseline is dependent on one’s interpretation of 
the religion clauses. 
In Part III historical material and commentary is used to posit that the 
American polity, collectively as a nation, may have suffered from a long-
standing ambivalence about the meaning of the religion clauses and the 
role for religion in the public sphere. This ambiguity contributes 
significantly to our difficulty with defining religious equality. In the 
Conclusion I examine whether it is possible to escape from this historical 
dilemma and end the elusive quest for the meaning of religious equality. 
One might do so by settling on either an extremely narrow or an extremely 
broad understanding of the religion clauses. In either event, I argue, we are 
not likely to leave problems of religious equality behind us. Alternatively, 
we could try to focus on whatever historic commonalities emerge from 
any general uncertainty or ambivalence and translate them into modern 
formulations. This last approach does not settle issues of legitimacy nor 
obviate interpretive challenges, but might take the spotlight off equality. 
 20. Some do not agree that equality should be the sole concern in implementing the 
Constitution’s religion guarantees. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 10, at 17 (2004) (“[E]quality is best 
seen as one important value in a rich and evolving tradition.”); id. at 39–40 (“[D]eviating from 
equality might sometimes best accommodate the interests at stake in particular contexts.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/3
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I. JURISPRUDENTIAL DIFFICULTIES 
A. The Multidimensional Nature of Equality 
In the analytical realm, some of the reasons that we encounter difficulty 
in identifying religious equality are fairly obvious. First, equality is itself a 
rather complex, multifaceted animal. It is an expansive concept that 
encompasses several dimensions, each of which can act as a jumping off 
point for controversy. Equality entails “subjects” as to which, “domains” 
within which, and “vantage points” from which it can be measured.21  
When addressing who are the proper subjects of equality in the area of 
religion, if the subjects are the various existing religions, equality would 
require some sort of equivalence (presumably, equivalent government 
treatment) among them.22 However, if the subjects of religious equality are 
viewed more broadly, equality may require equivalence between religious 
people, views, and interests, on the one hand, and secular people, views, 
and interests, on the other.23 
Similarly, equality for any given set of subjects may extend only to 
very limited, or alternatively to unlimited, domains.24 For example, 
equality could mean that the subjects being compared must be treated 
equally by the government within the limited sphere of financial aid, or, 
that they must be treated equally for all purposes, across the entire 
spectrum of governmental interaction with religion and religious 
individuals. 
 21. Hall, supra note 10, at 11–28 (discussing the subjects and domains of religious equality); id. 
at 40–46 (discussing the vantage points of religious equality). Hall maintains that identifying the 
subjects of religious equality occurs at two levels, the level of definition, in which a “subject class of 
individuals” is defined by certain particular traits, and the level of identification, in which one 
identifies individuals who possess the relevant traits. Id. at 11. This is the “who” of religious equality, 
while domains involve the “what” of religious equality, that is, “[w]hat goods or burdens are to be 
distributed equally?” Id. Consideration of vantage points recognizes that, not only must those who are 
similar be treated alike, but those who are different must be treated differently. Id. at 40. 
 22. See id. at 11 (noting that subjects determine “[w]ho will be treated equally,” and that 
“proponents of nonpreferential aid to religion argue that the Establishment Clause was intended to 
preclude preferences among religious groups, but not between religious and nonreligious activities”); 
Conkle, supra note 11, at 8 (explaining that “denominational equality is designed to enhance the 
freedom and dignity of all religious believers,” and that its central premise is that “[a]ny one religion, 
whatever its substance, is [legally] equal to any other.”). For a discussion of what counts as a religion, 
see infra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 23. Conkle, supra note 11, at 8 (“The broader notion of religious neutrality includes the 
requirement of denominational equality, but it also goes one step further, demanding that the 
government neither favor nor disfavor religion in general, as compared to nonreligion.”); Hall, supra 
note 10, at 12 (arguing that underlying claims of opponents of free exercise exemptions is the view 
that the Free Exercise Clause “treats religious believers and nonbelievers as equal subjects”). 
 24. See Hall, supra note 10, at 24. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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There are also different possible types or manifestations of equality.25 
In the law of religion, as in equal protection law generally, equality may 
be determined formally or functionally.26 Formal equality, sometimes 
referred to as equal treatment, would essentially require that the 
government treat all the subjects of equality in exactly the same way. It 
could not use religion as a means of classification, and effectively could 
not take religion into account in fashioning law or implementing policy.27 
Functional or substantive equality, sometimes also referred to as equal 
results or equal outcomes, would require the government to insure that 
religious people or interests of one religion achieve a kind of lived-out 
parity with those of other religions and/or the nonreligious, even if that 
means treating some or all religious interests differently in order to attain 
the equal result.28 Thus, substantive equality would sometimes impose an 
affirmative duty on government to take religion into account and even to 
classify on a religious basis.29 These two very different vantage points 
from which to measure equality often lead to quite dissimilar ultimate 
determinations. 
 25. See id. at 40 (calling these manifestations—treatment versus effect—the “vantage points” 
from which to measure whether equality has been achieved). 
 “Lot-regarding” equality . . . consists of distributing the same lot of a benefit or burden to 
each individual. “Person-regarding” equality consists of distributing lots in such a fashion that 
the distribution has the same impact on each individual, measured from the standpoint of the 
individuals themselves. Equal treatment and equal opportunity may be said to be examples of 
treatments that secure lot-regarding equality. Equal impact and equal outcomes suggest 
standards for treatment consistent with person-regarding equality. 
Id. at 41. 
 26. See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward 
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1989); see also Conkle, supra note 11, at 9–10 (discussing 
Professor Laycock’s thesis); Rutherford, supra note 2, at 1072 (“Formal equality calls for identical 
treatment, and does not allow for existing differences, while substantive equality requires 
individualized treatment to yield equal opportunity.”). 
 27. See Laycock, supra note 26, at 999–1001 (citing Kurland’s 1961 definition of religious 
neutrality); see also Conkle, supra note 11, at 9 (discussing Laycock’s definition). 
 28. See Laycock, supra note 26, at 1001–06 (defining substantive religious neutrality as “the 
religion clauses requir[ing] government to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or 
discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance”); see 
also Conkle, supra note 11, at 9–10 (discussing Laycock’s notion). Michael McConnell analogizes 
religious discrimination to disability discrimination because both religion and disability make 
individuals different in ways “that cannot be changed but can only be accommodated.” Michael W. 
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1140 
(1990). He argues: “If the paradigmatic instance of race discrimination is treating people who are 
fundamentally the same as if they were different, the paradigmatic instance of free exercise violations 
or handicap discrimination is treating people who are fundamentally different as if they were the 
same.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 29. See Laycock, supra note 26, at 1003–04. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/3
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Issues of subjects, domains, and vantage points must be resolved before 
one can talk meaningfully about religious equality. Given all the options, it 
is not surprising that we cannot seem to settle on a common 
understanding. This difficulty would appear to arise in every conversation 
about equality, yet it sometimes seems that we have more of a problem 
when speaking of religious equality than when applying the concept 
elsewhere. Why should that be the case? The next section explains. 
B. The Uniqueness of Religion 
A second analytical problem with identifying religious equality is that 
religion is unique. Equality is a comparative notion.30 When we investigate 
whether two things are equal, we compare them. But often religion is not 
quite like other things to which it might meaningfully be compared. 
To the extent that religion is a status, it is different from other kinds of 
constitutionally protected statuses, such as race or gender.31 For one thing, 
religion may be chosen, but race, gender, and other constitutionally 
protected statuses, for the most part, are not.32 In addition, most types of 
 30. See Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection 
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 333 (1986) 
(“‘Neutrality,’ like ‘equality,’ is a principle of relationship, not of content.”). Equal Protection, for 
example, might be described as a guarantee of comparative fairness, rather than a guarantee of 
universally identical treatment. The latter would be virtually impossible to achieve in a regulatory 
state. 
 31. See Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and 
Free Speech Values—A Critical Analysis of “Neutrality Theory” and Charitable Choice, 13 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 243, 260–67 (1999) (discussing similarities and differences between 
religion and other constitutionally-protected aspects of identity, such as race and gender). But see 
Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity: Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and 
Religion, 73 IND. L.J. 119 (1997) (arguing that race and religion play similar roles in self-identity and 
should therefore be treated alike for constitutional purposes). 
 32. See Theresa M. Beiner & John M. A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious 
Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 577, 590 (1997) (noting that “some commentators have 
distinguished [Title VII] religion claims because they are based on ‘chosen’ beliefs as opposed to 
innate characteristics such as race or sex”); Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A 
Principled Approach to Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 727–28 (1996) 
(maintaining that religious discrimination is different from other status-based discrimination covered 
by Title VII because it “is often based upon a difference of belief, unlike [other discriminations] which 
are based . . . on attributes dependent upon one’s birthright”; these differ because, unlike birthright, 
“beliefs and concepts are a matter of choice”); Robert Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of 
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2000) (stating that American 
antidiscrimination laws apply to religion as well as race and gender, even though the former is not 
“immutable” and is “within the control of a person”). But cf. Brownstein, supra note 2, at 109–12 
(arguing that, although “in many circumstances a person can change their [sic] religion” so that 
“religious groups would not be covered by the equal protection clause because of their mutable status,” 
nevertheless “it is [often] unrealistic to view this characteristic as mutable,” and “for constitutional 
purposes, religious affiliation is an immutable characteristic vis-á-vis state action”); Hall, supra note 
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constitutionally protected statuses do not require or involve either belief or 
practice,33 while religion involves both.34 As a result, considering what it 
means to treat other forms of protected status equally may not translate 
directly to considering what it means to treat religious status equally. 
Indeed, religion is not just a status. It could also be described as a 
philosophy, belief system, or world view. Yet religion is also not quite like 
other philosophies, beliefs, and world views. All are similar in that they 
are matters of conscience.35 However, unlike religion, philosophies, 
beliefs, and world views do not usually mandate conforming action on the 
part of the adherent.36 Religious rites, rituals, prayers, and other activities 
are often integral to what it means to say that one belongs to or is of a 
particular religion.37 
10, at 62 (arguing that religion works as a suspect classification in part because “[r]eligious 
convictions frequently appear to their possessors as immutable: something they did not choose, but 
which chose them.”). 
 33. See Brownstein, supra note 31, at 260 (regarding belief and practice); Jamar, supra note 32, 
at 727 (regarding belief). The status of being homosexual might be said to involve acts, though it has 
been argued that one can be homosexual without engaging in homosexual acts. In any event, 
homosexuality has not been recognized, at least not formally so, by the Supreme Court as a suspect 
classification warranting special constitutional protection, though Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), could be understood otherwise. 
 34. Brownstein, supra note 31, at 260 (“Religion is not like other suspect classifications such as 
race, national origin, or gender in [that] . . . [i]t has a belief and behavioral dimension that is lacking in 
other suspect classifications.”). 
 35. Daniel Conkle argues that the Supreme Court has adopted a rule of formal neutrality, which 
“rejects the notion of special protection for religious claims of conscience” over any or all other claims 
of conscience. Conkle, supra note 11, at 12–15. 
 36. It is possible that there are secular causes that call for particular action as well as common 
conscience on the part of their followers. Animal rights lovers may ask their supporters to boycott furs 
or meats. However, boycotting fur and meat would not usually be required for one to claim the identity 
of an animal rights lover. Nevertheless, some organizations that are not religious may similarly 
prescribe rituals and codes of conduct. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional 
Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 768 (1984) (“Professional and fraternal organizations have rituals and 
ethical codes that are not religious.”). And on the opposite side, one could certainly claim a religious 
identity without ever acting upon it, even though most religions make a set of actions obligatory for 
adherents. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 11, at 15 (explaining that under formal neutrality, which 
“rejects . . . special protection for religious claims of conscience, . . . we define our own consciences 
and determine what they require. Our consciences might include religious obligations, but then again 
they might not.”). I mean to make a general point, not to cover every possible example. See infra notes 
38–39 and accompanying text. 
 37. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“[T]he ‘exercise of religion’ often 
involves not only belief and profession but the performance of . . . physical acts: assembling with 
others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing . . . .”); 
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 2, at 1248–49 (“[R]eligion often involves the extensive, communal 
enactment of behavior and relationships . . . .”); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209–10 
(1972) (describing the Amish religion as requiring its adherents to live “in a church community 
separate and apart from the world and worldly influence,” in which “[t]heir conduct is regulated in 
great detail by the . . . rules[] of the church community”). Kent Greenawalt identifies characteristics 
commonly found among institutions considered “indisputably religious.” In addition to certain beliefs 
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What has just been said about religion as not quite like other forms of 
status or of belief is meant as a generalization. That is, at its core, religion 
is different in the ways described. Of course, there are more nuanced 
understandings in which religion may sometimes be considered an 
involuntary and immutable status like race or sex, or that, given modern 
science, sex and maybe even race may be argued to be mutable.38 
Similarly, nonreligious philosophies or beliefs may be coupled with 
customary or obligatory action, as is religion, or, on the opposite side, one 
may belong to some religion without a component of required action.39 
Yet, despite these marginal instances in which religion and other beliefs 
and statuses may seem to merge, it remains the case that, as a general 
matter, religion is usually different. 
This multifaceted quality of religion as status, coupled with belief, and 
accompanied by acts, exacerbates the problem of identifying the essence 
of religious equality, because it means that there is nothing really like 
religion to use as a point for comparison. Thus, agreement on what it 
means to achieve equality between religious people, entities, or views and 
and organizations, these common characteristics include practices such as “communication with God 
through ritual acts of worship and through corporate and individual prayer,” and “practices involving 
repentence and forgiveness of sins . . . .” Greenawalt, supra note 36, at 767. Of course, one may 
sincerely identify with a particular religion without adhering to any of its obligations, but this is not the 
usual case. 
 38. See Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 32, at 590 (describing sex and race as “innate 
characteristics”); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision 
Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 294 (1999) (“Doctors can now alter or remove all 
the biological sex indicators, other than chromosomes, by the administration of hormones and surgery. 
Current psychiatric work with transsexuals, however, indicates that sexual self-identity may be 
biologically based and probably not mutable.”); id. at 301 (noting opposing state court determinations 
of the “legal” sex of “post-operative transsexuals”); Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic 
Discrimination Exceptional?, 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 77, 87 (2003) (describing race and sex as traits that 
are “mutable only at great effort,” while religion is “highly mutable”); Jamar, supra note 32, at 727 
(contrasting discrimination based on “race, sex, color, national origin, age, and disability,” which are 
“attributes dependent upon one’s birthright,” with religious discrimination, which is “based on 
belief”); id. at 728 (asserting that a person cannot convert to a different race, origin, or sex, but can 
choose to convert to a different religion “merely by a genuine declaration of intent”); Post, supra note 
32, at 8 (calling race and sex immutable, but religion not). 
 39. See A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., Defining Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. 
PA. L. REV. 479, 487–88 (1968) (using an “institutional” as opposed to an “operational” definition of 
religion to recognize as members of a religious faith persons who hold themselves out as such but who 
do not personally participate in the rituals and ceremonies associated with the faith); Rebecca 
Redwood French, From Yoder to Yoda: Models of Traditional, Modern, and Postmodern Religion in 
U.S. Constitutional Law, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 76–78 (1999) (describing a kind of “postmodern” 
religion in which each individual creates his or her own religion by selecting “a customized cart full of 
preferred religious options,” using “a particular religion or parts of religious and other practices, and 
forg[ing] them into a personalized package of concepts and daily or yearly rituals”) (italics omitted); 
supra note 36 (regarding nonreligious beliefs coupled with required action). 
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other people, entities, or views may be especially elusive, more so than in 
other areas of equality law. 
C. Defining Religion 
The question of the similarity or dissimilarity of religion to other forms 
of status or belief raises another issue, the third analytical difficulty with 
identifying religious equality. In order to discuss points of similarity or 
dissimilarity among religions or between religion and other things—and 
thus in order to discuss religious equality—we need to determine what 
counts as religion. 
Defining religion, at least for constitutional or other legal purposes, is a 
notoriously complex and controversial endeavor. There are a number of 
different ways to define religion suggested in the literature.40 For instance, 
one possibility is to use a dictionary-style definition that specifies a set of 
required elements.41 Another might be to employ a philosophical 
formulation that attempts to identify what makes religion unique in one’s 
personal, inner experience. An example of such a definition would be Paul 
Tillich’s well-known ultimate concern formulation, defining as one’s 
religion whatever constitutes one’s “ultimate concern,” that is, “the 
fundamental wellspring of a person’s motivations and emotions.”42 
Finally, there are practical constructions of various sorts, such as Kent 
Greenawalt’s famous definition by analogy. Greenawalt proposes 
identifying what is a religion by comparing what are disputably religions 
to what are indisputably religions, but, unlike in the case of dictionary 
definitions, not requiring any particular common feature.43  
 40. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 579 (describing and analyzing several varied formulations); Dmitry N. Feofanov, Defining 
Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 309 (1994) (cataloguing numerous attempted 
definitions). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633–34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) 
(“The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from 
any human relation.”); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (“The term ‘religion’ has reference 
to one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his 
being and character, and of obedience to his will.”). 
 42. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 248–49 (1998) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s reference to Protestant theologian Paul Tillich’s functional “ultimate concern” definition of 
religion and evaluating Tillich’s approach); see also Feofanov, supra note 40, at 385 (“Religion is a 
manifestly non-rational (i.e., faith-based) belief concerning the alleged nature of the universe, 
sincerely held.”). 
 43. See Greenawalt, supra note 36, at 762–69 (proposing an analogical approach to defining 
religion); see also Boyan, supra note 39 (proposing an “operational” and “institutional” definition of 
religion). 
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As even this brief list suggests, defining religion is quite an 
undertaking in its own right. Since defining religious equality may be 
dependent on first defining religion, the former enterprise becomes as 
mired in controversy as the latter. 
II. DOCTRINAL DIFFICULTIES 
A. Neutrality’s Baseline 
A fourth difficulty with defining religious equality results from the 
application of constitutional doctrine and concerns the problem of 
baselines. It has been said about the related notion of “neutrality” that one 
must first establish a baseline from which to determine whether the 
government has acted neutrally toward religion.44 Since there is no 
“neutral” (that is, not value-dependent) perspective from which to measure 
whether the government has acted in a religiously neutral manner, it is 
argued, the notion of neutrality toward religion is inherently meaningless, 
ambiguous, or at least indeterminate.45 If neutrality and equality cover the 
 44. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious 
Speech by Private Speakers, 81 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) (“[N]eutrality in the sense of government 
conduct that insofar as possible neither encourages nor discourages religious belief or practice . . . 
requires identification of a base line from which to measure encouragement and discouragement.”); 
Laycock, supra note 26, at 1005 (“[S]ubstantive neutrality requires a baseline from which to measure 
[the government’s] encouragement and discouragement [of religion].”); cf. Ravitch, supra note 15, at 
506 (recognizing the claim that neutrality requires establishing a baseline from which it can be 
determined, but arguing that, “unless one can demonstrate the neutrality of the baseline itself, the 
baseline cannot support claims of neutrality”). But see Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 
78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 319–24 (1990) (arguing that determining a baseline “tacitly concedes that 
government cannot avoid choosing among deeply held and competing views about the meaning and 
role of religion,” and that such a determination does nothing to resolve the problem of neutrality). 
 45. E.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 96–97 (1995). Smith concludes that “the quest for neutrality . . . is 
an attempt to grasp an illusion.” Id. at 96. Because “there is no neutral vantage point that can permit 
the theorist or judge to transcend [the competing positions on religious freedom,] . . . a theory of 
religious freedom is as illusory as the ideal of neutrality it seeks to embody.” Id. at 97; see also 
Laycock, supra note 26, at 994 (“Those who think neutrality is meaningless have a point. We can 
agree on the principle of neutrality without having agreed on anything at all.”); id. at 1005 (suggesting 
that the necessary baseline from which to measure government encouragement or discouragement of 
religion, Laycock’s construct for identifying substantive neutrality, cannot be determined without 
applying judgment. “[T]here is no simple test that can be mechanically applied to yield sensible 
answers.”); Ravitch, supra note 15, at 492 (“neutrality . . . does not exist”); id. at 493 (“Claims of 
neutrality cannot be proven. There is no independent neutral truth or baseline to which they can be 
tethered. Thus, any baseline to which we attach neutrality is not neutral; claims of neutrality built on 
these baselines are by their nature not neutral.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 517 (“Since there is no 
neutral foundation or baseline that can be used to prove that something is ‘truly’ neutral, neutrality is 
nothing more than a buzzword and a dangerous one at that, because it implies that the supposedly 
neutral approach should be taken more seriously because it is actually neutral.”). 
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very same ground, as some seem to assume,46 then this analysis would 
explain why we cannot agree about equality, just as we cannot agree about 
neutrality. Different people view the matter from different baselines. 
B. Equality’s Baseline 
Even if equality and neutrality are not quite the same thing,47 equality 
nevertheless gives rise to a similar problem, perhaps a fifth reason we have 
trouble defining religious equality. Assuming they indeed are not the 
same, the baseline for determining religious equality might seem clearer at 
first than the baseline for establishing religious neutrality. Since equality is 
a comparative notion, the baseline is likewise a comparative one. The 
religious equality baseline would be the government’s treatment of the 
entity to which the government’s treatment of religion (or of a particular 
religion) is being compared.  
But the baseline is not really any clearer, because one must first 
ascertain what is the proper entity to which to compare religion for 
purposes of measuring equality—that is, what are the proper subjects of 
religious equality.48 Borrowing from Equal Protection law, one usually 
compares the government’s treatment of the individual making a claim of 
inequality to that of some other individual similarly situated with respect 
to the purpose of the government’s action.49 No matter what the 
government alleges is its purpose for any given action, however, it may be 
 46. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 878–83 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
“neutrality” has been used in at least three different senses in Supreme Court cases, including 
“equipoise,” “secular,” and, in its latest evolution, “evenhandedness”); Laycock, supra note 26, at 995 
(“Neutrality and equality are near cousins; they have most of the same attractions and most of the same 
inadequacies.”); Ravitch, supra note 15, at 508 (asserting that the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 
applied “formal-equality-as-formal-neutrality”); Smith, supra note 44, at 311–24 (explaining how 
neutrality and equality relate to liberalism, and concluding that “liberal equality is the alter ego of 
liberal neutrality” in a value-neutral version of liberalism). 
 47. Neutrality, like equality, could mean different things. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 878–83 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (referring to at least three different senses of the term “neutrality” evidenced in 
Supreme Court opinions, only one of which—evenhandedness—corresponds to something like 
equality). If it means government must act with “no preference” among the subjects of neutrality, it 
might correspond with equality. If, on the other hand, it means government must stay out of the matter 
altogether, it would not really correspond with equality; equality is not concerned with whether or not 
the state involves itself, but rather with how the state treats the subjects of equality when it does or 
does not act. 
 48. Regarding the “subjects” of religious equality, see supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 49. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 1.2, at 683–84 (7th ed. 
2004). 
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that there is never anyone similarly situated to the religious claimant when 
it comes to government treatment.50 
To illustrate, let us say the state pays for public elementary school 
textbooks. The question arises whether the state may or even must pay for 
similar texts for parochial schools. If the state claims its purpose is to 
support education, and an equality standard inheres, should the parochial 
schools be compared with the public schools, other private schools, both, 
or neither? One would need to determine whether any of these potentially 
comparable subjects are similarly situated to parochial schools with 
respect to the government’s aim of aiding education. 
But however one chooses to answer that question, given constitutional 
doctrine, the religious nature of the schools may in itself act as a factor 
that makes them different from all other potential recipients of state aid, no 
matter what the state is trying to achieve. That is to say, given the 
existence of the religion clauses and whatever they command in terms of 
permissible or required treatment of religious groups and individuals, it 
may be that what seem in other contexts like similarly situated subjects of 
some government purpose are not really similarly situated after all, 
because one or both of the religion clauses operates to restrain the 
government from treating religious subjects the same as others. Or, to put 
it differently, religion is unique not only owing to its inherent qualities, 
discussed earlier, but also because the Constitution uniquely refers to it in 
the religion clauses and therein specifies how government and religion—
and only government and religion—may interact.51 
Thus, the determination of the proper comparative subjects in a 
religious equality situation appears to require an understanding not only of 
the purpose for any given government action, as in every equal protection 
context, but also of the purpose or intended operation of the Constitution’s 
religion guarantees as well. If so, then identifying what it means to treat 
 50. In this particular respect, it would seem that at least other religious claimants may be 
similarly situated to any given religious claimant, even if nonreligious claimants differ. However, 
depending on exactly what is required by the religion clauses, even all religious claimants may not be 
similarly situated. 
 51. Cf. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004) (“[T]he subject of religion is one in which 
both the United States and state constitutions embody distinct views—in favor of free exercise, but 
opposed to establishment—that find no counterpart with respect to other callings or professions.”). 
 I don’t mean here to conclude that, in interpreting the religion clauses, one must treat religion as 
unique. Rather, I mean only to say that the clauses themselves apply uniquely to religion in its 
relationship to government, and not to any other thing and its relationship to the state. One could argue 
that other constitutional provisions are intended to effectuate some of the same or similar protections 
for constructs other than religion, but that is beyond the scope of this essay. 
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religion equally requires, in the first instance, a theory of our constitutional 
religious freedoms.  
III. HISTORICAL AMBIVALENCE ABOUT THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
Finding a theory of American religious freedom is exactly the rub, or 
the sixth obstacle to defining religious equality. We do not agree about the 
meaning of the religion clauses. It is not surprising that we cannot come to 
some accord regarding the meaning of religious equality when we do not 
agree about the constitutional parameters of church-state relations on 
which religious equality determinations are ultimately dependent. Until we 
reach a common understanding about the basic aims of the Constitution’s 
religion clause provisions and how the clauses were to accomplish these 
aims, we cannot hope to find a generally acceptable definition of religious 
equality.  
Here we are on more familiar ground. It is often the case that scholars 
and others do not agree among themselves about the meaning of 
constitutional provisions. In the case of these particular provisions, 
however, there may be more than the usual kinds of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty in interpreting many constitutional provisions stems from 
disputes about which mode of interpretation to utilize and to what outcome 
each leads us.52 In addition to these usual kinds of difficulties, it could be 
argued that, with regard to religion, the American people as a collective 
entity have never actually had a common understanding about what the 
clauses would or should mean, and consequently about the meaning of 
religious equality. It could even be maintained that, from the start, 
individuals themselves were uncertain of just what they had created when 
they drafted and adopted the First Amendment’s religion guarantees. 
Depending on one’s theory of constitutional interpretation, a perpetual 
haziness at multiple levels of society and possibly continuing throughout 
our history about the basic nature of the Constitution’s religious 
guarantees could be a significant obstacle to identifying the meaning of the 
religion clauses, and thus of religious equality. 
 52. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) 
(identifying six modalities of constitutional interpretation, namely, historical, textual, doctrinal, 
prudential, structural, and ethical). 
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A. At the Founding 
Originally, members of the founding generation, even some of those 
prominent in the formulation of the First Amendment, did not clearly 
agree with one another on what exactly was the ideal relationship between 
church and state, and thus may not have had a common idea about the 
extent of the operation of the religion clauses either.53 For example, there 
are differences even between well-known separationists James Madison 
and Thomas Jefferson. Madison maintained that the government should 
foster religious pluralism as a method of curtailing religious hegemony 
and strife.54 He was positively disposed toward religion55 and believed, 
along Enlightenment lines, that men could reach God through reason.56 
 53. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2744 (2005) (“The fair inference is 
that there was no common understanding about the limits of the establishment prohibition . . . .”); 
DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 18–21 (2003) (arguing that the 
Religion Clauses were originally intended to address issues of federalism, and “simply were not 
designed to be used—as they are today—as a statement of general principles concerning religious 
liberty and the relationship between religion and government,” a subject on which, given the deep and 
widespread division on the issue of disestablishment, “Congress and the ratifying state legislatures 
plainly could not have agreed”); JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 24 (2004) (explaining that four major and numerous 
other minor theological and political views influenced the framing generation: “[T]he founders often 
moved freely between two or more perspectives, shifted their allegiances or alliances over time, or 
changed their tones and tunes as they moved from formal writing to the pulpit or to the political 
platform.”); Steven G. Gey, More or Less Bunk: The Establishment Clause Answers That History 
Doesn’t Provide, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1617, 1619 (alluding to the “rich diversity evident in early 
American religious and political culture,” leading to the conclusion that “the history of religion in this 
country is a complicated and even contradictory affair” that does not provide “any definitive answers 
to the various issues raised by the Establishment Clause”); Joel A. Nichols, Religious Liberty in the 
Thirteenth Colony: Church-State Relations in Colonial and Early National Georgia, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1693, 1701 (2005) (suggesting that individual state understandings of the church-state 
relationship are particularly important because “there was not a singular understanding of the proper 
relationship between the government and religion” at the time the Constitution was formulated); 
Shiffrin, supra note 10, at 14 (“[T]he Framers themselves did not agree upon the appropriate 
relationship between religion and government.”); cf. Thomas C. Berg, The Voluntary Principle and 
Church Autonomy, Then and Now, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1593, 1595 (maintaining that, despite 
widespread historical consensus on the antebellum principle of voluntarism regarding religion, there 
were issues that remained “ambiguous or contained internal tensions”). 
 54. See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, (June 20, 
1785), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, app. at 63–72 (1947). When many religions 
were permitted to flourish, Madison believed, no single sect would predominate and impose itself on 
all. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (“A religious sect 
may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed 
over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source.”). 
 55. See Kathleen A. Brady, Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary 
Debates in Theology Can Help to Reconcile the Division on the Court Regarding Religious Expression 
by the State, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 433, 456 (1999). 
 56. Id. at 456–60. 
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While a healthy dose of separation was part of his ideal,57 it is at least 
theoretically possible that his vision, which valued organized religion and 
supported government fostering multiple religious sects, could also permit 
some degree of nonpreferential state support for religion.58 
Thomas Jefferson, though often cited as a relevant figure in this regard, 
was not on hand for the drafting of the First Amendment.59 Nevertheless, 
he was a prominent individual at the time and his views on religion seem 
to have been fairly well-known. While his vision was probably more 
extreme than most, it would seem as relevant as anyone else’s to 
ascertaining what at least some portion of the people understood about 
religion and government at the time. Jefferson, too, took an 
Enlightenment-inspired view of church and state,60 but he understood 
man’s relationship to God as one arrived at individually and solely through 
reason, with established churches playing no or even a negative role in the 
creation of that relationship.61 While also a believer (he referred to himself 
as a Unitarian and thought that reason would eventually lead all men to 
accept God on such terms),62 he was not as inclined as Madison to see the 
virtue of most organized religions of the day.63 His vision entailed a strong 
measure of separation and would seem to curtail most or all government 
support for religion, as well as preference. 
Thus, although they clearly shared points of commonality and are both 
often cited as separationists, it is not clear that even Madison and Jefferson 
entirely agreed about the ideal relationship of church and state.64 
 57. See id. at 456–58; McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2744 (quoting Madison to illustrate his 
separationist ideal); The Nation, not helping the argument for separating Church and State, 
http://althouse.blogspot.com/2005/02/nation-not-helping-argument-for.html (Feb. 8, 2005) (explaining 
that, when properly read in context, James Madison’s quotes show him to be supportive of religion and 
Christian principles, but nevertheless believing that Christianity had its “greatest lustre” when 
separated from the state). 
 58. As Michael McConnell has documented, Madison was more sympathetic to organized 
religion than Jefferson, and might have viewed separation as valuable more for protecting religion 
from society than, as Jefferson viewed it, for protecting society from religion. Michael W. McConnell, 
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 
1452–53 (1990); see also McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2749 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
Madison’s reverential reference to the “Almighty Being” in his first inaugural address); Rosenberger 
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 854–58 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(summarizing arguments that Madison either opposed all state support for religion (over irreligion) or 
just preferential aid to certain faiths, and siding with the latter position). 
 59. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); accord Brady, supra 
note 55, at 442. 
 60. Rutherford, supra note 2, at 1063. 
 61. Brady, supra note 55, at 451–55. 
 62. Id. at 453–55. 
 63. See id. 451–55. 
 64. See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 2, at 1272 (describing Michael McConnell’s historical 
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Moreover, despite their essentially coherent convictions about separation, 
and despite the possibility that early notions of separation might differ 
from modern notions, each occasionally engaged in activities that could 
give rise to claims of personal inconsistency or ambiguity on this point. 
For example, at the very same time that Madison, in connection with 
advocating for religious liberty in his home state of Virginia, maintained 
that “religion is ‘wholly exempt’ from the ‘cognizance’ of civil 
government,” he supported and even introduced laws in the state that 
would establish days of public fasting and thanksgiving and punish those 
who broke the Sabbath.65 He later changed his mind and decided that 
government proclamations recommending days of thanksgiving and fasts 
were antithetical to separationist principles.66 Similarly, there is evidence 
that Madison initially supported funding for legislative chaplains and then 
later reversed his position on this issue as well.67 
Jefferson expressed a fairly consistent strict separationist vision,68 but 
then similarly seemed to belie that conviction by praying and invoking 
divine assistance in both his inaugural addresses.69 While famously 
skeptical of organized religion, Jefferson nevertheless encouraged and at 
research showing “the serious divergence between the views of [Madison and Jefferson on religious 
freedom]”). 
 65. Brady, supra note 55, at 435 n.6 (citing this evidence to conclude that Madison “was not 
always sure where the line [between church and state] should be placed”). 
 66. Id. (recognizing that Madison’s views on the separation between church and state changed 
over time, particularly with regard to government proclamations of days of fasting and thanksgiving). 
 67. Id. at 445 n.51; CHESTER J. ANTIEAU ET AL., FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT: 
FORMATION AND EARLY HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES 178–81 (1964); see 
also Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2884 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Madison as 
opposing Congress’ appointment of chaplains paid with federal funds). 
 68. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), quoted in 
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting from Jefferson’s letter in which he 
interpreted the Establishment Clause as “building a wall of separation between church and State”); 
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2744 (2005) (“Jefferson . . . refused to issue 
Thanksgiving Proclamations because he believed that they violated the Constitution.”); Derek H. 
Davis, Editorial, Thomas Jefferson and the “Wall of Separation” Metaphor, 45 J. CHURCH & ST. 5, 10 
(2003) (noting that Jefferson was “well known for his unorthodox religious opinions as well as for his 
liberal views on religious liberty and the separation of church and state”). Although Jefferson was not 
in the country during the time that the First Amendment was formulated, he is nevertheless frequently 
cited, especially by the Court, as a Founder whose views on religion and the state are significant in 
understanding the religion clauses. Brady, supra note 55, at 439. 
 69. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633–34 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the 
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. 101-10, at 22–23 
(1989)). Akhil Amar observes that Jefferson had a consistent but different view of federal (which were 
prohibited) versus state (which were permitted) religious establishments, so that he proclaimed a 
religious Thanksgiving day as Governor but refused to do the same as President. Akhil Reed Amar, 
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1159 & n.136 (1991). This possibly 
consistent understanding of the Establishment Clause as only a restriction on federal power would not 
alter the weight of the remaining points raised in the text about Jefferson’s ambiguous stance. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1529 Charlow book pages.doc5/18/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
1548 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:1529 
 
 
 
 
 
 
least symbolically supported it even in relation to government by attending 
public church services on government property, including those held in the 
Capitol, even traveling through a rainstorm on one occasion to get to the 
House of Representatives in order to attend.70 In this regard, he is reported 
to have approved the use of the Capitol and other public buildings for 
church services, to have enlisted the military band to play religious music, 
and to have traveled an hour from the White House to get to the services.71 
On an official level, he also approved treaties with Indian tribes that 
provided government funds for spreading Christianity among them.72 And 
on a personal level, he called himself a Christian, signed letters “God bless 
you,” was a generous financial backer of the Virginia Bible Society, and 
prepared three important religious works during his lifetime that examined 
the philosophy of Jesus, one directed toward the Indians.73 
George Washington, clearly another influential figure, likewise 
displayed an ambiguous personal attitude toward religion, and possibly to 
the relationship between government and religion. On July 4, 1775, the 
day after he took command of the army, Washington issued an order 
stating: “The General . . . requires and expects of all officers and soldiers 
. . . a punctual attendance on Divine service, to implore the blessing of 
Heaven upon the means used for our safety and defense.”74 When he 
resigned from his post as general, he issued a letter in which he prayed that 
God would “incline the hearts of the citizens to cultivate a spirit of 
subordination and obedience to government,” and dispose the citizens to 
 70. See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE 21–23 (2002). 
 71. David. D. Kirkpatrick, Putting God Back Into American History, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, 
§ 4 (Week in Review), at 1. 
 72. Davis, supra note 68, at 13 (noting that Jefferson approved treaties with the Indians in which 
the government “underwrote the ‘propagation of the Gospel among the Heathen’”); Kirkpatrick, supra 
note 71, at 4. 
 73. David Barton, The Image and the Reality: Thomas Jefferson and the First Amendment, 17 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 399, 446–49 (2003); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. 
Benjamin Rush (Aug. 17, 1811) in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 614 
(Adrienne Koch & William Peden, eds., 1944) (signed “God bless you and preserve you”); Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Nov. 13, 1818) in id. at 690 (signed “God bless you and support 
you”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson (Jan. 13, 1807) in LETTERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 139 (Frank Irwin, ed., 1975) (signed “God bless you, my excellent friend”); Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to The Marquis de Lafayette (Feb. 14, 1815) in id. at 187 (signed “God bless you”); 
Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4. Also, on an arguably personal though perhaps quasi-public level, 
Jefferson invited the audience to pray at the conclusion of his second inaugural address. McCreary 
County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2749 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. 
Ct. 2854, 2883 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that public speeches by public officials are not 
recognized as exclusively government speech because they contain the personal views of the speaker). 
 74. WILLIAM J. JOHNSON, GEORGE WASHINGTON THE CHRISTIAN 69 (1919) (quoting from 
JARED SPARKS, 3 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 491 (1834–37) [hereinafter SPARKS]). 
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act with “the characteristics of the Divine Author of our blessed religion,” 
whose example it was necessary to imitate in order “to be a happy 
nation.”75 And, in 1796, in what is commonly known as his Farewell 
Address to the people of the United States, he was quoted as saying 
“reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can 
prevail in exclusion of religious principle.”76 
Nevertheless, despite these very public pronouncements of an 
important relationship between religion and government, Washington 
seemed to have something of an ambiguous personal relationship toward 
at least the organized religion of his day. He would more often use terms 
like “Providence” and standard deist references to a supreme being than 
refer to “God”;77 he rarely, if ever, spoke of Jesus Christ;78 and he 
belonged to the Free Masons, a group that supported Enlightenment-
inspired ideas about reason and natural law.79 One biographer 
characterized Washington as “[a] lukewarm Episcopalian” and even 
something of a deist, in that “he never took Communion, tended to talk 
about ‘Providence’ or ‘Destiny’ rather than God, and . . . preferred to stand 
rather than kneel when praying.”80 Perhaps these less than religiously 
orthodox personal views are consistent with the fact that, on one occasion 
to a Jewish audience, Washington publicly expressed what sounded like 
opposition to government preference for any particular religion.81 But on 
the other hand, this ecumenical position might be seen as standing in a 
somewhat uncomfortable relationship to his earlier invocation of the 
 75. Id. at 141 (quoting from 8 SPARKS at 440–41, 452). 
 76. Id. at 217–18 (quoting from 12 SPARKS at 227–28). 
 77. See PAUL F. BOLLER, JR., GEORGE WASHINGTON AND RELIGION 92–115 (1963). However, 
as Justice Scalia recently noted, Washington added the words, “so help me God” to the Presidential 
oath. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 78. See BOLLER, supra note 77 at 68–69 (explaining that one such reference was probably 
written by one of his aides into a document signed without editing by a busy Washington); id. at 74–75 
(arguing that one famous Washington document containing a probable reference to Christ was highly 
uncharacteristic, and that “the name of Christ . . . does not appear anywhere in [Washington’s] many 
letters to friends and associates throughout his life”); Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4. 
 79. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4; see also JOHN C. FITZPATRICK, GEORGE WASHINGTON 
HIMSELF 47 (1st ed. 1933) (mentioning Washington’s induction into the grand lodge of Free Masons 
in Fredericksburg, Virginia on November 4th, 1752). 
 80. JOSEPH J. ELLIS, HIS EXCELLENCY: GEORGE WASHINGTON 45 (2004); Kirkpatrick, supra 
note 71, at 4; accord McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2745 n.26 (2005) (citing JAMES 
THOMAS FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON: ANGUISH AND FAREWELL (1793–1799) 490 (1972), which 
describes Washington’s religious belief as “that of the enlightenment: deism”). 
 81. In a letter to the Hebrew Congregation in Newport, Rhode Island, Washington wrote: “All 
possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship. It is now no more that toleration is 
spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of 
their inherent natural rights.” Letter from George Washington to the Touro Synagogue (1790). 
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indispensable example for citizenship supplied by the “Divine Author of 
our blessed religion,” a reference at least to Christianity and apparently to 
Christ.82 Did Washington mean all Americans have a natural right to their 
own personal form of religious freedom, but imitating Christ is necessary 
to be a good American citizen? 
A number of other prominent individuals could be argued similarly to 
have displayed somewhat ambiguous or inconsistent attitudes on the 
matter of religion, and some on church-state relations as well. Founding 
father Benjamin Rush strongly advocated that substantial instruction in the 
Christian religion be part of a system of public education.83 Though he 
remained committed to the idea that Christian values were important to a 
civic republican ideal, he apparently moved from one Protestant 
denomination to another during his lifetime until he abandoned all 
organized churches and ended his life as a Unitarian-Universalist.84 
Benjamin Franklin, though a noted religious skeptic, is reported to have 
proposed that the Constitutional Convention begin each day with a prayer 
because “the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth—
that God governs in the Affairs of Men.”85 Thomas Paine was infamous in 
the United States for his publication of The Age of Reason, in which he 
derided organized religion and attacked its belief in what he considered 
biblical superstitions.86 Yet Paine also criticized schools for teaching the 
 82. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 83. BENJAMIN RUSH, Plan for the Establishment of Public Schools (1786), reprinted in ESSAYS 
ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 3 (Frederick Rudolph ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1965) (calling 
for a plan for public schools in Pennsylvania that “is friendly to religion”); BENJAMIN RUSH, Thoughts 
upon the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic (1786), reprinted in ESSAYS ON EDUCATION IN THE 
EARLY REPUBLIC 10 (Frederick Rudolph, ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1965) (“[T]he only foundation for 
a useful education in a republic is to be laid in RELIGION.”). See generally id. at 10–13. See also 
BENJAMIN RUSH, A DEFENCE OF THE USE OF THE BIBLE AS A SCHOOL BOOK (1791), reprinted in 
BENJAMIN RUSH, ESSAYS: LITERARY, MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 55 (Michael Meranze ed., Union 
College Press 1988) (presenting “arguments in favor of the use of the bible as a schoolbook”). 
 84. See ROBERT H. ABZUG, COSMOS CRUMBLING: AMERICAN REFORM AND THE RELIGIOUS 
IMAGINATION 11–29 (1994) (tracing Rush’s movement from conventional Protestant Christianity to a 
Universalist spirituality); Charles A. Howe, Benjamin Rush, DICTIONARY OF UNITARIAN AND 
UNIVERSALIST BIOGRAPHY, http://www.uua.org/uuhs/duub/articles/benjaminrush.html. 
 85. NEWT GINGRICH, WINNING THE FUTURE: A 21ST CENTURY CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 47 
(2005). See also Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4 (reporting that the Convention declined Franklin’s 
suggestion to hire a chaplain because it might leave the negative impression that the body’s 
deliberations were not going well). 
 86. See generally MARY A. BEST, THOMAS PAINE: PROPHET AND MARTYR OF DEMOCRACY 
312–13 (1927) (opining that the first part of The Age of Reason “set the Christian world on fire”); 
GREGORY CLAEYS, THOMAS PAINE: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 177 (1989) (characterizing The 
Age of Reason as Paine’s “most . . . ill-fated work” because of its “primarily negative” impact in the 
1790s); SAMUEL EDWARDS, REBEL!: A BIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS PAINE 186 (1974) (detailing Paine’s 
vilification upon the publication of The Age of Reason by noting that “[s]ome of his contemporaries 
even said that he was fortunate to have been in prison when it was published, because he might have 
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sciences as the accomplishments of man when instead they should have 
been taught “theologically,” by which he meant with reference to God, 
“for all the principles of science are of divine origin.”87 
Other influential figures of the time on religious issues exhibited 
similar ambiguity or inconsistencies when it came to either religion or 
religion and the state. For example, from the Baptist camp (Baptists were 
generally proponents of separationism88), Isaac Backus, an evangelist 
active in the struggle for disestablishment and religious liberty in New 
England, adopted the separationist mantle, yet he seemed to have no 
problem with requiring Protestant-based religious oaths for state 
officeholders; official days of fasting, thanksgiving, and prayer; and 
legislative chaplains (except for his objection to a denominational 
preference for Episcopalians).89 One historian has argued that most 
Baptists at this time, though they similarly shared separationist ideals and 
were opposed to compulsory religious taxation, did not object to the state 
maintaining a Christian character.90 To that end, many were unopposed to 
compulsory Protestant church attendance, the inculcation of the 
Westminster Confession of Faith in the public schools, and Puritan laws 
against profanity, blasphemy, gambling, card playing, theater-going, and 
desecration of the Sabbath.91 If these views were intended to describe 
separationism, it was a very different animal than that of which we speak 
today. 
been lynched by outraged mobs had he been free”); HAROLD NICOLSON, THE AGE OF REASON: THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 377 (1961) (noting that in The Age of Reason, Paine “made fun of the Bible” 
and “denied the miraculous birth of Christ”); R.B. Bernstein, Rediscovering Thomas Paine, 39 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 873, 925–26 (1994) (describing The Age of Reason as Paine’s “great attack on ‘revealed 
religion’” and noting his opposition to “the tyranny of organized religion,” despite the fact that he was 
“[a] deeply religious man”). 
 87. Thomas Paine, The Existence of God, Address Delivered as a Discourse at the Society of 
Theophilanthropists in Paris (Jan. 16, 1797), available at http://www.scaevola.com/deism/existence_ 
of_god.htm. See also Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4 (noting that Paine criticized schools in France 
“for teaching science without emphasizing the role of a divine ‘Creator’”). 
 88. Brady, supra note 55, at 444–45. 
 89. See ISAAC BACKUS, THE TESTIMONY OF TWO WITNESSES 46–47 (Boston, Samuel Hall 2d 
ed. 1793) (voicing Backus’s complaint that Episcopalians served as legislative chaplains); WILLIAM G. 
MCLOUGHLIN, SOUL LIBERTY: THE BAPTISTS’ STRUGGLE IN NEW ENGLAND, 1630–1833, at 267 
(1991) (“Backus was . . . far from having a clear-cut position on the precise line to be drawn between 
church and state.”); id. at 267–68 (regarding religious oaths and days of fasting, thanksgiving and 
prayer); Brady, supra note 55, at 444–45 & nn.44–45, 47–50, 52–54, 56. 
 90. See MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 89, at 267–69 (regarding the Westminster Confession; 
“Puritan blue laws” punishing blasphemy, profanity, and profaning the Sabbath; and laws against 
gambling, card playing, dancing, and theatergoing); WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, ISAAC BACKUS AND 
THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION 148–49 (1967). 
 91. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 89, at 268–69; MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 90, at 149. 
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To sum up the matter of the Founders’ views, they apparently 
expressed widely varying opinions and engaged in varying practices with 
respect to the mixing of religion and government, several occasionally 
acting in ways that seem at least arguably inconsistent with positions they 
espoused. Sometimes their views about religion or their actions with 
regard to the intersection of religion and government appeared at least 
mildly confused or somewhat inconsistent, or changed over time. For 
these and other reasons, some historians and others—recently including 
Supreme Court justices—conclude that these leaders’ public expressions 
of faith do not necessarily tell us very much about their notion of the ideal 
relationship between church and state.92 Indeed, their notions of the ideal 
might not have been clearly delineated even to themselves, and even if 
their ideals were consistent and well-defined, given the diversity of 
viewpoints in general, no particular individual view was necessarily 
embedded in the religion clauses.93 
It is not entirely clear where Congress, as the nation’s representative, 
stood on the matter of religion and government either. Several scholars 
point to practices of the early Congresses that are similarly at odds with 
strict separationist principles.94 Congress allocated funds for legislative 
chaplains,95 and re-enacted the Northwest Ordinance despite that 
 92. Davis, supra note 68, at 8 (“[T]he Founding Fathers’ intent on [the meaning of the 
Establishment Clause] is fraught with ambiguities,” reflected in the eleven drafts of the religion 
clauses that “are roughly equally divided between language that adopts nonpreferentialism on the one 
hand and separationism on the other”); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2888 (2005) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“As the widely divergent views espoused by the leaders of our founding era plainly reveal, 
the historical record of the preincorporation Establishment Clause is too indeterminate to serve as an 
interpretive North Star.”); Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4. See also Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2888 
n.33 (citing Justice Souter’s concurrence in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 626 (1992) for the 
proposition that “‘at best, . . . the Framers simply did not share a common understanding of the 
Establishment Clause,’ and at worst, their overtly religious proclamations show ‘that they . . . could 
raise constitutional ideals one day and turn their backs on them the next’”). 
 93. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2744 (2005) (“The fair inference is that there 
was no common understanding about the limits of the establishment prohibition . . . . What the 
evidence does show is a group of statesmen . . . who proposed a guarantee with contours not wholly 
worked out . . . .”); cf. MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 89, at 269 (arguing that “Jefferson and Madison 
spoke for a rationalist-humanist element in American thought that . . . throughout most of our history 
has been the view of a small minority,” while Backus’s “evangelical view of Separationism . . . has 
predominated”). 
 94. See, e.g., ANTIEAU, supra note 67, at 181–82 (describing the practice of early Congresses of 
employing and paying chaplains for both houses of Congress and for army and navy troops); id. at 182 
(noting that Congress adopted a resolution asking the President to declare a day of public thanksgiving 
and prayer on the same day it adopted a resolution recommending the First Amendment to the states); 
THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 217 (1986) (making the same point about the First Congress); Brady, supra note 
55, at 441–42 & n.31. 
 95. ANTIEAU, supra note 67, at 181; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984); Marsh v. 
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provision’s express support for encouraging religion, on the ground that 
religion was necessary for good government.96 Also, the first proclamation 
of thanksgiving and prayer, issued by President Washington in 1789, arose 
in response to a congressional resolution.97 But do we really know just 
what the nation’s representatives considered to be the reach of the religion 
clauses? There does not seem to be sufficient evidence to determine what, 
if anything, were most of their individual views, let alone a consistent and 
collective vision to guide us.98 
Similarly, at the state level during the period of ratification, no clear 
picture of the meaning of religious freedom emerges.99 Leonard Levy’s 
treatise on the history of the Establishment Clause maintains that debates 
about the rights to be considered for inclusion in a bill of rights “occurred 
on a level of abstraction so vague as to convey the impression that 
Americans . . . had only the most nebulous conception of the meanings of 
the . . . rights they sought to insure,” and that the principal advocates for 
“rights of conscience” (among other rights) did not supply any reasoned 
analysis of the meaning, reach, or limits of such rights.100 He concludes 
that, despite the wide variation during this period in state practices, 
constitutions, and laws with regard to religious establishments, the subject 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–92 (1983). 
 96. An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 
50, 52 & n.(a) (1789) (“Northwest Ordinance”) (reenacting The Northwest Ordinance of July 13, 
1787, which provided: “Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government . . . , 
schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38, 100 (1985) (stating that Congress’s reenactment of the Northwest Ordinance confirms that 
Congress did not intend that Government “should be neutral between religion and irreligion”); Brady, 
supra note 55, at 477 & n.260. 
 97. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 100–03 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also ANTIEAU, supra note 67, at 
182; CURRY, supra note 94, at 217. 
 98. But cf. CURRY, supra note 94, at 208–17 (arguing that, viewing the events surrounding 
passage of the Bill of Rights in light of the broader context of colonial and revolutionary America, 
Congress’ intent regarding the religion clauses is not so ambiguous as the work of many previous 
historians would seem to imply). 
 The passage of the First Amendment constituted a symbolic act, a declaration for the 
future, an assurance to those nervous about the federal government that it was not going to 
reverse any of the guarantees for religious liberty won by the revolutionary states. Because it 
was making explicit the non-existence of a power, not regulating or curbing one that existed, 
Congress approached the subject in a somewhat hasty and absentminded manner. To examine 
the two clauses of the amendment as carefully worded analysis of Church-State relations 
would be to overburden them. Similarly, to see the two clauses as separate, balanced, 
competing, or carefully worked out prohibitions designed to meet different eventualities 
would be to read into the minds of the actors far more than was there. 
Id. at 216. 
 99. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 66–74 (1986) (discussing ratification debates in various states). 
 100. Id. at 66–67. 
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“was rarely mentioned at all and then only very briefly” in the state 
ratifying convention debates.101 Philip Kurland surmises that state ratifying 
conventions that drafted bills of rights did so “more from habit than from 
reason,” and that, other than generally moving toward more religious 
toleration from the founding to statehood, “no pattern can be discerned 
among the fundamental documents governing religion within the colonies 
and the states.”102 Levy’s explication of the available records concerning 
drafting and ratification of the Establishment Clause similarly does not 
produce any clear or cohesive vision of the intended scope of that 
provision.103  
As for the actual policies and practices within the states at the time, 
some states never had, or had recently abolished, their state 
establishments, while others, including Connecticut, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and South Carolina, still maintained—and some say 
wholeheartedly endorsed—their established churches,104 some into the 
mid-nineteenth century.105 And some of the staunch supporters of these 
state establishments were defenders of the need for the Federal 
Constitution’s religion clauses, probably understanding them not as 
guarantees of church-state separation generally, but rather as embodying 
the federalist principle of leaving the matter of religion wholly to the states 
in order to protect their states’ locally established preferences.106 This wide 
variety of opinion in the states about the ideal relationship between church 
and state does not suggest any particular consensus about the religion 
clauses generally, beyond the rejection of an official federal church. 
 101. Id. at 66–74. Levy argues that this is because the federal government was universally 
understood to have no power at all to act with respect to religion under the proposed Constitution. Id. 
at 74; accord CURRY, supra note 94, at 215–16. 
 102. Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 839, 851–52 (1986). See generally id. at 851–53 (describing widely varying and inconsistent 
state practices and policies with regard to religious freedom and establishments). 
 103. LEVY, supra note 99, at 84–89. Here, again, Levy argues that the relevant history 
nevertheless teaches that the federal government “had no power to legislate on the subject of religion.” 
Id. at 89. 
 104. Id. at 66–74 (explaining that Pennsylvania never experienced an establishment of religion; 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and South Carolina maintained establishments at the 
time of ratification; Maryland’s constitution permitted one though none existed; New York did not 
have an establishment; Virginia had recently abandoned its established religion; and North Carolina 
ended its establishment before the ratification debates). 
 105. Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4 (citing historian Gordon Wood); see also Daniel O. Conkle, 
Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1132–33 & n.98 
(1988) (noting that seven of the fourteen states presented with the issue of ratifying the First 
Amendment embraced anti-establishment policies at that time, while the remaining seven maintained 
or authorized established religions). 
 106. See Brady, supra note 55, at 441 n.30 (discussing Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee). 
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In addition, many provisions for and advocates of religious freedom at 
the state level did not understand the notion to include everyone. Equality 
was fine for most Christian sects, but not for all,107 and often not for some 
or all non-Christians.108  
For what it may be worth, there even seems to be reason to wonder 
about the religiosity of the average citizen of the time. Many maintain that 
the country was deeply devout, but others point to evidence that might 
question that reality.109 One commentator concludes that: 
Most Americans in the founding era probably held a “centrist” 
position that favored limited government support for religion. The 
type of “mild” establishment that they envisioned typically included 
laws protecting Sabbath observance; the proclamation of days of 
thanksgiving, prayer and fasting, and other public acknowledgments 
of the country’s dependence on God; legislative and military 
chaplains; laws punishing blasphemy; and support for religious 
education. . . . [T]he strict disestablishment position implemented in 
Virginia was an anomaly in the late eighteenth century, and . . . 
 107. Catholics, for example, were often treated as a legally unequal, disfavored Christian sect. 
See, e.g., S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 3255–56 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) (providing for equality for “all 
denominations of Christian Protestants”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XIX, reprinted in id. at 2597 
(applying civil rights only to Protestants). 
 108. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 10, at 12–13 (explaining that “[m]ost states originally limited the 
scope of equality to Christian denominations and sects”); Kurland, supra note 102, at 851–52 (“[M]ost 
opinion voiced in New England was animated by desire to exclude non-Protestants from public 
office—not by toleration but by intolerance.”). See generally MORTON BORDEN, JEWS, TURKS, AND 
INFIDELS (1984) (discussing the hurdles that non-Christians had to overcome in their struggle to repeal 
state laws that were religiously discriminatory). See also McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 
2745 (2005) (“[H]istory shows that the religion of concern to the Framers was not that of the 
monotheistic faiths generally, but Christianity in particular”); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 
2885–87 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing various sources to establish that the originally intended 
coverage of religious freedom was limited to Christians). 
 109. Compare Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part 
I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2109 (2003) (“[M]ost members of the 
founding generation believed deeply that some type of religious conviction was necessary for public 
virtue.”), with ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776–1990, at 22–23 
(1992) (marshalling evidence that “in 1776 only about one out of five New Englanders had a religious 
affiliation,” “Boston’s taverns were probably fuller on Saturday night than were its churches on 
Sunday morning,” and “single women in New England during the colonial period were more likely to 
be sexually active than to belong to a church,” to establish that, although these facts didn’t prove the 
colonists “were irreligious[,] . . . their faith lacked public expression and organized influence”). Cf. 
Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4 (quoting professor emeritus Forrest McDonald as saying that 
“Christians probably outnumbered deists among the founders”). 
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most state practices, in fact, included numerous forms of 
cooperation between church and state.110 
But another, assessing the same history, resolves: 
 The vast majority of Americans assumed that theirs was a 
Christian, i.e. Protestant, country, and they automatically expected 
that government would uphold the commonly agreed on Protestant 
ethos and morality. In many instances, they had not come to grips 
with the implications their belief in the powerlessness of 
government in religious matters held for a society in which the 
values, customs, and forms of Protestant Christianity thoroughly 
permeated civil and political life. The contradiction between their 
theory and their practice became evident to Americans only later, 
with the advent of a more religiously pluralistic society, when it 
became the subject of a disputation that continues to the present.111 
What these differing, uncertain, or ambiguous views about religion and 
church-state relations translate into in terms of the meaning of the 
Constitution’s religion guarantees, and then in turn religious equality, is 
less than lucid.112 It is possible to conclude that, from the very inception, 
there was no single, general understanding of the religious freedom 
represented by the First Amendment. The collective “we” could not have 
had one in common, as individuals did not even have one within 
themselves. Some people, maybe even many, held sometimes inconsistent 
or changing views of the relationship between government and religion, or 
professed a view and then acted at odds with it. Some appear even to have 
had uncertain or inconsistent views toward religion itself, or at least 
toward organized churches and theologies, leaving us to wonder how this 
might affect what they thought of church and state. Some prominent 
 110. Brady, supra note 55, at 470–71 (footnotes omitted). See generally id. at 470–77. 
 111. CURRY, supra note 94, at 219. 
 112. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 105, at 1132 (footnotes omitted): 
Needless to say, it can be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to determine the original 
understanding of a provision in the Bill of Rights. The evidentiary materials are woefully 
incomplete, and it is difficult to determine the relevance and relative weight of the various 
types of evidence that do exist. The historical question addressed in the Everson-Rehnquist 
debate is one that falls prey to these evidentiary and analytical problems; as a result, it is 
difficult to say whether the framers and ratifiers of the establishment clause intended to adopt 
a broad or a more narrow prohibition on congressional action. 
See also, Veronica C. Abreu, Muddled Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause: A 
Comparative Critique of Philip Hamburger’s and Noah Feldman’s Historical Arguments, 23 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 615 (evaluating the implications of divergent views of early Americans on 
religious liberty). 
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figures were committed in theory to separation of church and state at all 
levels of government, but did not seem to see the need to practice it 
completely at any. Perhaps people expected the religion clauses to embody 
whatever state of affairs they lived with at the time—for example, 
nonestablishment meant no tithing to an official federal denomination—or 
perhaps they thought these new guarantees were supposed to usher in a 
new, more inclusive or more separationist ideal. Or more likely, perhaps 
people had not resolved this question, in either a general sense or certainly 
in its particular applications, not each in his or her own mind and certainly 
not collectively. 
B. At Incorporation 
The picture does not become clearer if we fast forward to the period of 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is supposed to be the 
source of incorporation of the religion guarantees. One commentator, for 
example, argues that the religious equality notion of Free Exercise 
embraced by the founding generation had evolved into a religious liberty 
notion advanced by the post-Civil War generation, and that the 
Establishment Clause, originally intended as an establishment-neutral 
reservation of power to state majorities, was then transformed into a tool 
to express the rights of citizens against state majorities, thus altering 
altogether the meaning of the Constitution’s religious guarantees.113 Others 
 113. Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Relgious Exemptions Under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1106, 1109–10, 1149 (1994) (“[T]he Free Exercise 
Clause was adopted a second time through its incorporation into the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and . . . the scope of the new Free Exercise Clause was intended to 
include protections unanticipated at the Founding.”). Lash argues that the common understanding of 
Free Exercise changed from an equality concern with anti-targeting to a liberty concern with 
affirmatively requiring state accommodations. See id. at 1109 (“[T]he Privileges or Immunities Clause 
incorporated a conception of religious liberty vastly different from that intended in 1791 and 
constitutes a constitutional modification of the original ‘rights of conscience.’”); id. at 1149 (arguing 
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause indicated their intent 
that it was to protect religious exercise—in both its mandatory and discretionary aspects—as a 
substantive right against not only majoritarian hostility but also majoritarian indifference, so that 
generally applicable laws might thereafter violate constitutionally protected religious liberty). But see 
Jonathan P. Brose, In Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not 
Incorporate the Establishment Clause, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1 (1998) (arguing that Free Exercise was 
always understood as a liberty guarantee, and that incorporation of Free Exercise by the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not change that understanding). 
 Akhil Amar makes a related, though not identical argument. He describes how the Establishment 
Clause effectively mutated from a structural provision enforcing federalism, and agnostic regarding 
establishments at the founding, into at least a weak substantive right grounded in either liberty or 
equality that was then incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 246–54 (1998). He similarly expounds on the 
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argue that incorporation insured or cemented religious equality rather than 
or as superior to religious liberty.114 Another, along with his own 
supporters, maintains simply that “[t]he evidence seems inescapable: the 
fourteenth amendment, as originally understood, did not incorporate the 
establishment clause for application to the states.”115 If these and other 
differing interpretations are any indication, adding incorporation into the 
mix surely does not obviate the difficulty of determining the meaning of 
the religion guarantees.116 
There is evidence that prominent leaders at the time of the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment were likewise somewhat ambiguous on the 
matter of religion or religion and state, as at the founding. For example, 
evincing his personal attitude toward religion, Abraham Lincoln was not 
baptized and never joined a church,117 though apparently church 
reconstruction of the Free Exercise Clause, from its original admonition only against Congress 
enacting laws targeting religious acts for persecution, into the Fourteenth Amendment’s version, which 
creates a substantive privilege in the individual to be free even from unintentional encroachment on 
religious activity, that is, a kind of “libertarian autonomy from governmental intrusion.” Id. at 254–56. 
 114. See Rutherford, supra note 2, at 1060, 1065 (noting that “[e]quality was central to our 
founding as a nation” and also “provided the unifying theme of the Fourteenth Amendment”); id. at 
1067 (because older parts of the Constitution should be reconciled with later-adopted parts, “the First 
Amendment Religion Clauses should be interpreted in ways that are consistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment paradigm of equality,” so that “when the Religion Clauses clash with the egalitarian goals 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the egalitarian principles must prevail”); cf. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1988) (tracing the historical evolution of the Fourteenth Amendment 
generally, including agreement over its equality concern and disagreement over its liberty aspects). 
 115. Conkle, supra note 105, at 1138–39; accord Amar, supra note 69, at 1157–58 (arguing that it 
is particularly awkward to view the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating the Establishment Clause 
so as to prevent state establishments, because the very purpose of the Establishment Clause was to 
protect the states’ right to choose whether to establish a religion free from federal government 
interference; for this and other reasons, incorporation of the Establishment Clause is inappropriate); 
see also Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2865 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (presenting the 
view that the Establishment Clause’s text and history do not support incorporation). 
 116. See Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties With the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1577–89 (1995) (describing very 
conflicting views of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of its adoption on the issue of whether it 
incorporated an equality-based or liberty-based view of the First Amendment, including the religion 
clauses). 
 117. Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4; ELTON TRUEBLOOD, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THEOLOGIAN OF 
AMERICAN ANGUISH 5 (1973) (noting that Lincoln was never a church member). Lincoln explained 
this in a letter to Colonel A. J. Warner, December 30, 1864: 
 I have never united myself to any church, because I have found difficulty in giving my 
assent, without mental reservations, to the long, complicated statement of Christian doctrine 
which characterize their Articles of Belief and Confessions of Faith. When any church will 
inscribe over its altar, as its sole qualification for membership, the Saviour’s condensed 
statement of both Law and Gospel, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and 
with all thy soul and with all thy mind, and thy neighbor as thyself,” that church will I join 
with all my heart and all my soul. 
AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, CONSISTING OF THE PERSONAL PORTIONS OF HIS 
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membership was generally not the norm during this period.118 He is 
reported to have rarely mentioned Jesus,119 and is often famously 
considered irreligious.120 But his wife described him as “a man of faith,” 
even if not technically a Christian, and her assessment is backed by 
evidence of his occasional resorts to faith and his well-known uses of 
Biblical rhetoric in public addresses.121 Shortly before his death, when 
asked by a clergyman whether he loved Jesus, he reportedly replied: 
When I left Springfield I asked the people to pray for me. I was not 
a Christian. When I buried my son, the severest trial of my life, I 
was not a Christian. But when I went to Gettysburg and saw the 
graves of thousands of our soldiers, I then and there consecrated 
myself to Christ. Yes, I do love Jesus.122 
One commentator sums up Lincoln’s religiosity by describing him as 
“wrestl[ing] with faith, longing to be more religious, but never getting 
there.”123 
What exactly does this personal spiritual journey, coupled with mixed 
public religious references, tell us about Lincoln’s views on government 
and religion generally, or the Constitution’s religious guarantees in 
particular? As with leaders of the revolutionary period, not all that much, 
let alone anything precise or consistent. Perhaps it makes one skeptical 
LETTERS SPEECHES AND CONVERSATIONS 442 (Nathaniel Wright Stephenson ed., 1926). 
 118. See TRUEBLOOD, supra note 117, at 95–97 (explaining that “only 23 percent of the 
population were church members in 1860,” but that church membership was not then synonymous 
with being a “serious Christian”). 
 119. Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4. However, Lincoln is reported to have used “no less than 
forty-nine designations” to refer to “the Deity,” among them “Jesus,” “Christ,” “Crucified One,” and 
“God.” WILLIAM J. JOHNSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE CHRISTIAN 215–17 (1913). 
 120. Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4. 
 121. Id. (referring to Mary Lincoln’s assessment and citing particular instances of possible 
religiosity on Lincoln’s part). Mary Lincoln was quoted as having stated that Lincoln “never joined 
any Church. He was a religious man always, I think, but not a technical Christian.” WILLIAM 
HERNDON, RELIGION OF LINCOLN (quoted from FRANKLIN STEINER, THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF OUR 
PRESIDENTS 118 (1995)). See generally TRUEBLOOD, supra note 117; JOHNSON, supra note 119. In a 
handbill printed on July 31, 1846, addressed to “The Voters of the Seventh Congressional District 
Fellow Citizens,” Lincoln writes: “That I am not a member of any Christian Church, is true; but I have 
never denied the truth of the Scripture; and I have never spoken with intentional disrespect of religion 
in general, or of any denomination of Christians in particular.” TRUEBLOOD, supra note 117, at 15. 
Trueblood calls “unjustified” the popular conclusion, drawn from Lincoln’s failure to join a church, 
that he “had no strong or vital faith.” Id. at 95. He argues: “To question . . . whether Lincoln believed 
in God is a clear waste of time and effort. The answer is obvious. The only valuable inquiry is that of 
how he believed.” Id. at 121. 
 122. JOHNSON, supra note 119, at 172 (quoting O. H. OLDROYD, LINCOLN MEMORIAL ALBUM 
366 (1883)). 
 123. David Brooks, Stuck in Lincoln’s Land, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005, at A35 (“[Lincoln] was 
mesmerized by religion, but could never shake his skepticism.”). 
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that he could have maintained a definitive and coherent position on the 
legal issue of religion if he held such a troubled position on the personal 
issue of religion, though in theory they are separate matters. Whatever we 
think of Lincoln’s view, more importantly, we do not have any clearer 
picture of the generally prevalent view of religious freedom during his day 
than of his own personal view. If the wildly varying conclusions of the 
scholarly debate is any indication, it is not any more likely that a 
consistent, common notion of the ideal or the commonly understood vision 
of government and religion will emerge by looking at evidence from the 
post-Civil War, Fourteenth Amendment period than by looking at the 
more frequently discussed founding period, when at least the drafting and 
application of the religion clauses was on the front burner, so to speak.  
C. Today 
There seems even less hope of finding agreement today. Issues of 
religion are among those one strives to avoid at social gatherings for fear 
of upsetting civility. From people on the street, to those in the media, to 
political actors, to academics, the debate over the proper resolution of 
church-state issues rages at every turn.124 We are a country divided, at 
least with regard to religion and government.125 With increased religious 
heterogeneity over time, in addition to the seemingly increasing 
prominence and political power of some religious minorities (particularly 
non-Christians), it is unlikely we will ever agree. If we have never and will 
never agree about the meaning of constitutionally required religious 
freedom, it seems pretty well assured that we will not agree about religious 
equality either. 
 124. Brady, supra note 55, at 435; see, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, The Myth of Separation: America’s 
Historical Experience with Church and State, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 475 (2004) (discussing religious 
divisions in the 2004 United States Presidential election); Scott C. Idelman, Liberty in the Balance: 
Religion, Politics, and American Constitutionalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991 (1996) (book 
review) (illustrating current divisions among scholars about historic understandings regarding church 
and state and their significance). 
 125. See supra note 124; Kirkpatrick, supra note 71, at 4 (titling one insert “The Partisan Divide, 
Then and Now”). See generally NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE 
PROBLEM AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 6 (2005) (hereinafter FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD) 
(“The deep divide in American life . . . is not primarily over religious belief or affiliation—it is over 
the role that belief should play in the business of politics and government.”); Noah Feldman, A 
Church-State Solution, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, § 6 (Magazine), at 28 [hereinafter Feldman, A 
Church-State Solution] (arguing that the church-state debate in America today is dominated by two 
opposing camps, “values evangelicals” and “legal secularists,” and proposing a new compromise 
between these two views). 
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D. In the Court 
To compound the problem, the Supreme Court’s religion jurisprudence, 
when viewed as it emerged over this same historical period, reflects a 
marked and particular ambivalence about church-state doctrine. The 
Court’s doctrinal evolution under both clauses wanders about, not 
following a consistent trajectory—even one with fits and starts—in a 
single, general direction.126 Under Supreme Court tutelage in the twentieth 
century, the Establishment Clause first seemed to require separation of 
church and state,127 then, at times, no-endorsement of religion128 or no-
coercion toward religion,129 followed today largely by religious neutrality 
in some areas, but then not in others.130  
 126. This pattern might be contrasted with, for example, Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. It 
could be argued that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of rights under the Equal Protection Clause 
has consistently, though perhaps with occasional fits and starts, moved toward greater expansion of 
rights for specially protected individuals and the inclusion of more protected classifications. 
 127. The Lemon test, articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–15 (1971), is usually 
understood to have adopted a rule of separation. See Conkle, supra note 105, at 1125 (discussing how 
the Lemon test embodied the separationist doctrine adopted in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 
U.S. 1 (1947)). 
 128. See. e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) (“In recent years, we 
have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either has the 
purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion, a concern that has long had a place in our Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688, 690–92 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Shiffrin, supra note 10, at 36; see also Feldman, supra note 11, at 694–700 (tracing 
developments in the evolution of Establishment Clause jurisprudence to demonstrate a transformation 
in the rationale of the Clause from protecting the liberty of conscience of religious dissenters to 
guaranteeing the political equality of religious minorities). 
 129. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Does, 530 U.S. 
290, 310–13 (2000) (applying Lee’s non-coercion test to a school district’s policy regarding student-
led prayers before high school football games); McConnell, supra note 3, at 157–59 (citing the 
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Kennedy in County of Allegheny as the origin of the 
“coercion” test used in Lee, and concluding that, in 1992, it was too soon to determine whether 
coercion would be the Court’s establishment standard); see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 1, at 558 
(noting “the rise of both the endorsement and coercion tests” in the years before 2002). 
 130. Compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652–55 (2002) (“[Prior cases] make 
clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion . . . the program is not 
readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.”), Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809–
14 (2000) (explaining how government neutrality emerges from prior Establishment Clause cases as 
the central concern), and Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian 
Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 924 (2003) 
(describing Zelman’s and Mitchell’s neutrality rule), with Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) 
(conspicuously avoiding use of neutrality as the rule of decision in upholding a public display of the 
Ten Commandments). Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 
43 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1087–1101 (2002) (positing that Establishment Clause doctrine has followed 
two competing doctrines of separation and neutrality, and suggesting a method of reconciling the two). 
It may be that different Establishment Clause disputes call upon different doctrines, so that, for 
example, religious symbols cases employ a historical practice (Van Orden) or a no endorsement 
(Lynch/Allegheny) rule, while school funding cases employ the neutrality (Mitchell/Zelman) test. 
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Doctrinal ambivalence seems even more pronounced in the Free 
Exercise arena. At first, there were no constitutionally required 
exemptions for religious acts or actors.131 Then exemptions were said 
sometimes to be required.132 This was followed by a period in which 
constitutionally required exemptions were formally the rule,133 but in fact 
balancing usually occurred and exemptions were only rarely actually 
required.134 Today, we once again have a general default rule of no 
constitutionally required exemptions.135 Rather than moving in a straight, 
or even a wavy, line, the Court seems literally to have been rounding a 
circle.136 Perhaps we ought not fault the Court for failing to reach a general 
consensus about a matter that may have begun and continued for 200 years 
without one. 
CONCLUSION 
There are many reasons why we cannot identify what it means to treat 
religion equally. Equality is itself too broad-ranging a concept. It operates 
along several different axes, each of which must be determined before we 
can establish what equality means in a given context. It is not clear who 
are the proper subjects or what is the proper domain of religious equality. 
Equality takes different forms, including formal and substantive varieties; 
one must decide which to apply. Equality requires comparisons of like 
entities, but religion is different in significant respects from most of the 
things to which one would assume it ought normally to be compared for 
 131. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878) (finding no constitutional 
exemption for the religious exercise of polygamy). 
 132. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (distinguishing between direct and 
indirect burdens on religious exercise, the former triggering a standard of review much more likely to 
result in invalidating the state’s action than the latter). 
 133. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–15, 221–29 (1972) (holding that only a state 
interest “of the highest order” may justify denying the free exercise of religion, and the State’s interest 
in universal education did not qualify where an Amish education alternatively satisfied the State’s 
concerns); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (imposing a compelling state interest standard 
on government actions that incidentally burden a claimant’s religious exercise). 
 134. See Eisgruber and Sager, supra note 2, at 1246 (noting that the Court applied strict scrutiny 
to burdens on religious practices only in Sherbert v. Verner and its progeny and in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
but not in other pre-Smith cases). 
 135. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (stating that “the right of free 
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of 
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes).’”). 
 136. Hall, supra note 10, at 47 (tracing the irregular path of Free Exercise interpretation and 
concluding, “The Court can now assert with pride that free exercise jurisprudence has managed to end 
the twentieth century without significant change from its position at the end of the nineteenth 
century.”). 
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this purpose. Indeed, religion is itself especially unamenable to definition. 
Defining or measuring equality may require establishing a baseline, which 
would involve making value-laden moral or political judgments. And, 
most important, one cannot apply an equality norm without attacking the 
underlying and particularly pernicious problem of identifying a theory of 
the religion clauses. This is an area in which there is, and probably always 
has been, substantial disagreement and uncertainty.  
At this point it might seem best to avoid equality if possible. Is such a 
thing possible, especially given the central focus of so many on this 
particular construct? One could argue, and some have, that equality is not 
the be all and end all of religion jurisprudence anyway.137 There are 
competing understandings of the religion clauses that would enable us to 
interpret and apply them without fully coming to grips with equality. 
For example, an originalist could glean a minimal common 
denominator of agreement and hold that up as the original understanding. 
The minimalist originalist could argue that all understood the 
Establishment Clause to forbid formally declaring a particular federal 
church and requiring contribution for its maintenance. He could also argue 
that all understood the Free Exercise Clause to prohibit government’s 
deliberate attempts explicitly to suppress religious belief, though not 
necessarily to interfere with religious practice or even all manner of 
religious expression. Thus, originalists might conclude that the original 
understanding of neither clause requires application of equality norms: the 
Establishment Clause only forbids a federal church,138 the Free Exercise 
Clause only forbids targeted religious persecution,139 and incorporation 
either never occurred or did not alter these least common denominators at 
all, or at most simply brought them down from the federal to the state 
 137. Shriffrin, supra note 10, at 15 (“[T]he religion clauses cannot be explained by reference to 
equality.”); see also Hall, supra note 10, at 77 (“[R]eligious equality, though not the only value 
embedded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses, is an important value . . . .”). 
 138. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 45, at 21 (indicating that the religion clauses struck a 
compromise between the traditionalists, who favored government support for religion, and the 
voluntarists, who opposed it, by assigning the matter to the jurisdiction of the states); see also AMAR, 
supra note 113, at 248 (recounting such a federalist understanding of the Establishment Clause); 
CURRY, supra note 94, at 207–08 (describing arguments of critics of the Everson decision who 
contended that the Establishment Clause “was intended only to ban a state religion”); cf. GERARD A. 
BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (1987) (suggesting a sect-equality 
understanding of the Establishment Clause as opposed to a no-aid-to-religion understanding). 
 139. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) 
(holding that Free Exercise Clause protections “pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some 
or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons,” 
since historically it was religious persecution that concerned its drafters). Targeting, however, is a 
concept that might encompass equality concerns. 
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level.140 Though perhaps neither says exactly this, recent opinions from the 
pens of Justices Thomas and Scalia at least hint at and sometimes assert 
much of it.141 
From what appears to be the other end of the political spectrum, Steven 
Shiffrin has recently argued that there are seven values underlying each of 
the religion clauses, and that the courts should consider all of them, as they 
suggest their relevance, in every Establishment and Free Exercise case.142 
While not abandoning equality or eliminating entirely the need to ascertain 
what it is, this theory would certainly downplay its significance.143 
Finally, we might try to focus on something other than equality per se. 
Taking a more middle-of-the-road approach, one could envision the 
essential command of both religion clauses not as requiring either formal 
or substantive equality, but rather as forbidding the government from 
skewing private choice in matters of religion. Private choice could be 
skewed either through significant selective aid (Establishment Clause) or 
through significant selective burden on religious action when such is not 
necessary (Free Exercise Clause).144 This interpretation of First 
Amendment purpose would not obviate the difficult determinations 
needed to decide individual cases, but it might take them out of the 
confusing and elusive world of equality-speak.145 
 140. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 105, at 1139 (“There is substantial historical evidence . . . that 
. . . the framers and ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to incorporate the 
establishment clause for application against the states.”); see also supra notes 113–16 and 
accompanying text. 
 141. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2864–68 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2748–64 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 142. Shiffrin, supra note 10 at 13–15. Shiffrin maintains that he is not calling for ad hoc balancing 
in all cases, id. at 15, but it is difficult to distinguish his analysis from just that. 
 143. Id. at 15 (“I argue that the religion clauses cannot be explained by reference to equality.”); id. 
at 16 (“Deviations from religious equality are not always fatal. . . . Similarly, compliance with 
religious equality should not always pass muster under the religion clauses.”); id. at 17 (“[R]eligious 
equality cannot possibly be achieved in a diverse society.”). 
 144. See, e.g., Alan Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 
YALE L.J. 692, 693 (1968) (suggesting that the Establishment Clause “should be read to prohibit only 
aid which has as its motive or substantial effect the imposition of religious belief or practice,” which is 
“the core value” of the clause); id. at 723 (explaining why the no-aid principle is preferable to an 
equal-aid principle); id. at 728 (arguing that perfect neutrality is neither possible nor the fundamental 
establishment value). Although the text uses the term “selective” to modify “aid” and “burden,” and 
thereby might suggest some comparative measurement, the proposal need not require the full realm of 
equality determinations discussed earlier. 
 145. One suspects that equality discussions would seep into the application of this principle as 
well. For example, in determining what is “selective” aid to religion (under Establishment) or a 
“selective” burden on religious action (under Free Exercise), comparisons, and thus notions of 
equality, could easily play a role. 
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Or maybe it would not. Even if it were possible to interpret the religion 
clauses in a non-equality-based way, there is still the Equal Protection 
Clause to contend with. Reading equality out of the First Amendment 
would probably only lead to its resurrection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment (and through reverse incorporation, the Fifth).146 We seem 
drawn inexorably to the ideal of equality in all areas of public life, religion 
being just one among many. If only we could agree on what it means. 
Whichever side one finds affinity with in the matter of religion and 
government, equality and its concomitant confusions are likely to be part 
of the common vocabulary and unlikely to shed much light on the debate. 
Even if this journey does not bring us to a satisfactory point in 
ascertaining or avoiding the meaning of religious equality, perhaps the 
historical account compiled above might instead lead to a useful 
understanding of American religious freedom, as it is embodied in the 
religion clauses. Three historically consistent points seem to emerge: First, 
most Americans have always and continue generally to express a belief in 
a god or supernatural spirit of some sort. Second, we generally respect the 
idea or value of religion, whether or not we ourselves embrace religion 
and whether or not we find fault with particular or all organized religions. 
Third, we have always subscribed at least to an ideal of religious tolerance 
and non-denominationalism.  
Even those public figures who displayed ambiguous attitudes toward, 
or engaged in ambiguous practices with regard to, religion in general, or to 
their own personal religion in particular, seemed to count themselves as 
believers. In the early years, this pro-belief attitude took the form of 
adherence to and public expressions of Protestant Christianity. While there 
was more than a bit of actual religious intolerance, at least formally 
Americans espoused the ideals of tolerance and non-denominationalism 
within their Protestant Christianity.  
 146. Equal Protection is largely omitted, at least formally, from religion and government analyses 
because the religion clauses seem to have been read to cover whatever equality component might be 
afforded constitutionally to religion. See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 2, at 1084 (footnote omitted): 
 Although a few cases implicitly apply an equal protection analysis to religious 
discrimination, courts rarely deal directly with the issue of discrimination on the basis of 
religion. Instead, claims of discrimination on the basis of religion typically are recast as free 
exercise claims. As a result, the appropriate level of scrutiny for religious discrimination is 
unclear. 
Id. If this reading were to change, the door would be open to applying the Equal Protection Clause in 
its own right. At least some of the problems of analyzing religion in equality terms that are mentioned 
herein, if not all, would reappear, now under the guise of Equal Protection Clause analysis. See 
generally Meyler, supra note 10 (discussing the historical and proper relationships between free 
exercise and equal protection). 
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Today we are more pluralistic, but the basic dynamic of our attitudes 
about religion and the church-state relationship seems similar. That is, as a 
general matter, most still seem to accept that it is a good thing to have a 
religion, whatever it may be, or at least to believe in a god or overarching 
spirit of some sort. Likewise, most also generally appear willing to tolerate 
some level of public expression of religiosity, at the very least “minor” 
instances of ceremonial deism, such as “In God We Trust” on our coins, or 
a solemn prayer at a public ceremony to honor those killed on September 
11, 2001. Moreover, we also generally seem to agree that denominational 
preference is unacceptable, and we have broadened our non-
preferentialism to encompass not only all Christians but also, at a 
minimum, mainstream religious faiths. 
Using these principles of common agreement as a guide, one could 
imagine the translation of earlier apparently acceptable acts of religious 
affirmance to modern equivalents. Just as an example—and these are only 
meant to illustrate the point, not to argue for or against adopting these, or 
any, translations—reciting Protestant prayers at government sponsored 
events might now take the religiously milder, less denominational form of 
singing “God Bless America.” Teaching of Christian texts and precepts in 
public schools might now mean that non-denominationally available 
school vouchers are sometimes acceptable instead. Or, public days of 
fasting, thanksgiving, and prayer might now translate into allowing 
religious symbols in public parks on relevant occasions, as long as all 
religions are permitted to display theirs in due course. 
Whether this particular or some other translated version of our 
historical commonality is desirable, supportable, or possible is a different 
matter entirely, and a subject for another treatise.147 Not only is the idea of 
updating historical practices open to debate, but on a practical level, 
certainly translation raises its own set of attendant difficulties of 
interpretation and application. The suggestion here is only that accepting 
the view that we never quite knew just what we wrought when we 
fashioned the religion clauses does not necessarily doom us to live in a 
perpetual state of confusion. Perhaps something useful may be salvaged 
from the possible historical ambiguity in the understanding of American 
religious freedom, and from the fundamental disagreement about the 
meaning of religious equality that ensues from that uncertain 
understanding.
 147. Though he discusses it in different terms, one could argue that an example of a different sort 
of translation is contained in recent writings of Noah Feldman. See, e.g., FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD, 
supra note 125; Feldman, A Church-State Solution, supra note 125. 
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